Introduction
The circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry (COI) into special agricultural and business leases (SABLs) in Papua New Guinea (PNG) have already been described in Chapter 6. This chapter deals with the political ramifications of the findings and recommendations that were officially published at the end of 2013, and explores some of the factors responsible for the length of time that it took for the Commission to finish its work, and the length of time that it has since taken for the PNG government to produce a coherent response.
This chapter has two main parts. The first part contains an interview that I (Colin Filer) conducted with Chief Commissioner John Numapo in April 2014, six months after the public release of his final report. 1 The interview was conducted by email correspondence between the two of us. At that juncture, John had been contracted by the Australian aid program to strengthen the magisterial services of Solomon Islands, and was therefore resident in Honiara. His responses to my questions are printed in italics. These responses have only been edited for the sake of stylistic consistency with the rest of the chapter. I have added occasional footnotes to his responses to clarify or query the significance of some of his statements. John has no responsibility for any of the other statements made in this chapter.
The second part of the chapter consists of an account of some of the more significant actions, decisions and arguments that have taken place since this interview was conducted, and that cast some light on the PNG government's response to the recommendations made in John's report and that of his fellow commissioner, Nicholas Mirou. This shows that there is no clear direction to the policy process in which the COI was embedded, and leads to some rather depressing conclusions about the rule of law in PNG.
An Interview with John Numapo, April 2014

COLIN:
Can you tell us what factors delayed the tabling of the Commission's final reports in the national parliament for a period of 18 months after the Commission completed its hearings in March 2012?
JOHN:
Let me start by giving you some background to the whole inquiry itself and how we structured it. The COI adopted a 'four-phased' approach 
In fact, the government still owes the commissioners and members of the legal and technical teams 15 months of unpaid allowances and salaries that are still yet to be paid to this day. The delay in the production of the recorded transcripts to assist the commissioners with their final write-ups, and the lack of cooperation and display of arrogance by certain members of the COI, also affected the completion of the final reports by the given deadline. Certain factors that contributed towards the delay were totally beyond our control and
were not of our making.
Due to the above factors, I then wrote to the Chief Secretary and the Prime Minister seeking extension of time to submit the final reports. The Prime Minister granted us an extension to the end of June 2013. With respect to the delay in presenting the final reports to Parliament, this is a matter entirely within the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and I cannot comment on that. What I can say is that we have delivered the final reports by the given deadline. The final reports were submitted to the government on 26 June 2013.
2 John appears to be referring to the constitutional crisis that occurred in December 2011, when the Supreme Court ruled that the parliamentary vote by which Peter O'Neill had replaced Michael Somare as Prime Minister had been unconstitutional. This produced a standoff that lasted for several weeks as each man tried to assert his legal authority over the executive arm of the state. O'Neill won this battle because he retained his parliamentary majority, but the authority of the Supreme Court was seriously weakened.
COLIN:
To what extent do you think that the failure of one of the three commissioners to submit his own final report has made it difficult for the government to implement the Commission's recommendations? What is to be done about the 30 or more leases which Commissioner Jerewai investigated, given that his recommendations are not available to the government?
JOHN:
Apart 
COLIN:
At the beginning of your own final report, you recommended 'that the current SABL setup be done away entirely' (Numapo 2013: 4) , but towards the end, you recommended that special agricultural and business leases should 'be retained … [as] a national development and customary landowner empowerment mechanism ' (ibid.: 255) . In his statement to Parliament in September 2013, the Prime Minister himself expressed some surprise that you had recommended retention of the 'SABL setup' after finding that only four of the leases investigated by yourself and Commissioner Mirou had genuine landowner consent. Can you explain this apparent contradiction in your recommendations?
JOHN:
The overall recommendation of the COI is that the current SABL setup is a complete failure and must be abolished. (Numapo 2013: 9) This is a reference to the Land (Tenure Conversion) Act that dates from the period of Australian colonial administration and allows for the conversion of customary land to individual freehold titles. Very little use has been made of this legislation, and the National Land Development Taskforce recommended that it be repealed (GoPNG 2007: 96) .
COLIN:
At the beginning of your final report (Numapo 2013: 5) , you also talk about the need for a 'policy platform [that] will set the foundation for harmonizing the legal framework and pave the way for the State to access customary land in a non-threatening and landowner friendly way'. At the end of your report (ibid.: 261), you call this a 'National Land Policy Harmonization exercise'. What do you think is the single most essential ingredient of such a policy platform?
JOHN:
The 
COLIN:
At the end of your report (Numapo 2013: 264) , you say that special agricultural and business leases should be reserved for so-called 'high-impact' projects that need large areas of land. But, by my calculation, 98 per cent of the land that has been covered by such leases since 1996 has been devoted to projects with a size of more than 10,000 hectares, which their supporters would all probably describe as 'high-impact' projects. So how do you expect the process of acquiring customary land for projects of this kind to be different and better in future?
JOHN:
Let me put some background to it before I attempt to answer the question. 
COLIN:
Some senior public servants have been saying that the government is afraid to revoke those leases under which subleases have been granted to foreign investors because of the risk that these investors will sue the government for compensation and the courts will grant their claims. How would you assess the validity of this argument? 
At one point in your final report (Numapo 2013: 236) , you said that the Commission 'received evidence of undue "political pressures" being put on government officials by senior ministers and politicians to fast-track SABL applications and issue titles'. You gave a couple of examples of such pressures being applied. However, I wonder if you felt constrained by your terms of reference from telling a more detailed story about the extent to which such pressures were driving public servants to neglect their duties.
JOHN:
I (Numapo 2013: 262-3) .
COLIN:
During the course of the Commission's hearings, you and the other commissioners were sometimes at pains to point out that you were not pursuing an agenda set by local or international environmental nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) or 'greenies'. Do you think that the extent of lobbying by these groups could actually be giving the government an excuse to ignore the Commission's recommendations? 
Some people have argued that amendments recently made to the Land Groups Incorporation Act and the Land Registration Act, which make it possible for incorporated land groups to directly register titles to their customary land and then grant subleases to investors, make the whole of the 'lease-leaseback scheme' redundant, so all reference to special agricultural and business leases should simply be removed from the Land Act. What are your thoughts on this subject? JOHN: (Numapo 2013: 262 
In a number of cases investigated by the Commission, it turned out that the landowners opposing the grant of leases to one particular landowner company and its preferred foreign investor were mainly interested in having the leases granted to a different landowner company and another foreign investor. In some cases, you suggested that the competing factions should just sit down, sort out their differences, and come up with a plan on which both sides could agree. 
Another Cabinet Decision
When Peter O'Neill presented the two final reports of the COI to the national parliament in September 2013, he declared that '[w]e will no longer watch on as foreign owned companies come in and con our landowners, chop down our forests and then take the proceeds offshore' (Nicholas 2013a) . But what was he going to do about it? He initially undertook to establish a ministerial committee that would recommend an appropriate course of action within a period of two months (Nicholas 2013b ), but when he tabled the reports in Parliament, he said that the Minister for Lands and Physical Planning would appoint a taskforce to design a new legal framework for the conversion of customary land into leasehold land (Nicholas 2013a ). It was not clear whether these were meant to be two distinct initiatives, nor was there any indication of how the new legal framework might relate to the one that had come into effect at the start of the previous year.
Nothing more was heard of the committee or the taskforce until February 2014, when the Prime Minister told a radio audience that the committee would be chaired by the Forests Minister, Patrick Pruaitch, and the other members would be the Lands Minister, Benny Allan, and the Agriculture Minister, Tommy Tomscoll (Nicholas 2014) . This news prompted the Eco-Forestry Forum to call for the removal of Pruaitch from the whole process on the grounds that putting him in charge of it would be like 'giving the keys of the blood bank to Dracula' (Act Now 2014b). It is not clear whether this observation was based on the belief that any forests minister would be reluctant to cancel forest clearing authorities or on the fact that two such permits had been allocated to agro-forestry projects in this minister's own electorate. In any case, it does not seem to have been a factor in O'Neill's subsequent decision to give Pruaitch the treasury portfolio and appoint Douglas Tomuriesa as the new Forests Minister. Tomuriesa convened a meeting of the Ministerial Committee in May 2014, and its recommendations formed the basis of a cabinet decision made in June (Act Now 2014c).
On the question of how to rectify the previous abuse of the lease-leaseback scheme, there were three key elements to this decision:
• all SABLs that John Numapo and Nicholas Mirou had recommended for revocation were to be revoked; In order to ensure that such abuse could not be repeated:
• the Lands Department was directed to keep following the previous instruction not to grant any more SABLs, and the NFB was directed to keep following the previous instruction not to grant any more forest clearing authorities over areas covered by SABLs; • the Land Act was to be amended to remove the provisions allowing for the grant of SABLs; and • administration of the land group incorporation process was to be transferred from the Lands Department to the Investment Promotion Authority.
Despite the length of time that had elapsed since the Prime Minister promised to act on the COI's findings, this decision seemed at first sight to satisfy most of the demands that had been made by various members of the land grab policy network, including members of the anti-dependency group. 5 It may have fallen short of their demand for an immediate cancellation of all forest clearing authorities, but it still ignored an earlier ruling of the National Court that said the National Executive Council did not have the power to prevent the NFB from granting such permits 5 The decision to remove Sections 11 and 102 from the Land Act actually went beyond the recommendations contained in John Numapo's final report.
in the first place.
6 Tiffany Twivey (formerly Nonggor), who had been a member of the conservation policy community in her capacity as legal adviser to the Eco-Forestry Forum, but was now Peter O'Neill's legal adviser, welcomed the cabinet decision as a great victory for the people of PNG and proof of the Prime Minister's good faith (Act Now 2014d).
But then something strange happened. In July 2014, the Office of the Registrar of Titles in the Lands Department published notices in the national newspapers that summoned the 22 corporate entities holding 29 SABLs to return the original copies of their leases in compliance with the cabinet decision. Fourteen agro-forestry projects were affected by this order, but only three of these had forest clearing authorities that were still valid.
7 Needless to say, the notices made no mention of the 26 leases on which Alois Jerewai had failed to report, but they also left out another 20 leases on which the other two commissioners had provided recommendations. Some of these 20 leases had already been invalidated in one way or another, and some of the smaller ones did not exhibit the sort of abuse that would warrant their cancellation, but eight of them were associated with major agro-forestry projects, and these eight leases should have been revoked if the cabinet decision was going to be implemented (see Table 8 .1). It was not immediately obvious what these eight projects had in common that might explain their omission from the list. Six of them had been granted forest clearing authorities that were still valid, five were exporting logs in 2012, four were doing so in 2013, and three were still doing so in 2014. One of the two projects that exported logs in all three of those years was the Bewani project in West Sepik Province, but this project was sponsored by Belden Namah, and he was now an enemy of the Prime Minister. The other project that exported logs in all three years was the Central New Hanover project in New Ireland Province, but this project, like the Danfu project in the same province, was sponsored by a former Provincial Premier, Pedi Anis, whose influence over the relevant government ministers was equally tenuous. Perhaps some clue may be found in a statement attributed to the Prime Minister a few days after the cabinet decision, in which he said that 'those SABLs with genuine investors and genuine partnerships with the landowners should work through the Lands Department to acquire new leases to enable them to continue their projects' (Miae 2014) , but this does not reflect the decision that was actually made. One might also speculate about the capacity of the various project sponsors or developers to influence the officials in the Lands Department who were responsible for making up the public notices, but one might equally suppose that the latter were guilty of that same negligence for which they had been taken to task by the commissioners. The Forests Minister was later quoted as saying that some SABLs were not revoked because of the amount of money already invested in their development (Tlozek 2015) , but this point would hardly seem to apply to the two leases from which no logs had yet been extracted.
The Twists and Turns of Turubu
Another clue to the mystery surrounding the implementation of the cabinet decision may be found in the political and legal history of one big operational agro-forestry project whose SABL was included in the public notice issued by the Lands Department. This was the Wewak Turubu Integrated Agriculture Project, generally known as the Turubu project, which operates on a lease of more than 100,000 hectares in the vicinity of Wewak, the capital of East Sepik Province. This is one of several agroforestry projects, in various stages of development, that have generally been endorsed by local politicians, including the former Prime Minister, Michael Somare, as part of a grand plan to create what is sometimes called an 'economic corridor' running through the middle of the province. 8 The Turubu project has been established on an SABL that was granted to a company called Sepik Oil Palm Plantation Ltd in 2008. This is actually a joint venture between a local landowner company called Limawo Holdings Ltd and a foreign investor called Wewak Agriculture Development Ltd. The project secured a forest clearing authority in 2009, and more than 400,000 cubic metres of logs were exported from the area over the following five years. Like the Sigite-Mukus project in East New Britain, this project has attracted a good deal of attention from members of the conservation policy community, first because the area is home to an eco-forestry project that has served as a conduit for protests by dissident landowners, and second because it has been claimed that the foreign investor is one of PNG's well-established logging companies.
9 When Nicholas Mirou conducted his hearings in Wewak in February 2012, he was harassed and abused by supporters of the agro-forestry project because they thought he was secretly in league with the dissidents (Mirou 2013: 831-2) .
It seems that two different groups of dissident landowners took legal action to get the SABL revoked by the National Court, the first in 2011, the second in 2012 (Sheila Sukwianomb, personal communication, December 2014). The first group obtained a restraining order to halt the logging operation in May 2012 (Matthias 2012), but it does not seem to have had much effect. It was the second group that eventually won its case in July 2014, when Justice Gavara-Nanu nullified the SABL on the grounds that it breached the provisions of the Land Act and the National Constitution.
10 This judgement was delivered during the interval between 8 Much of the inspiration for this plan came from Sepik migrants who were involved in the development of the existing oil palm schemes in West New Britain. 9 The logging company in question is WTK Realty Ltd, which has held concessions in West Sepik Province for many years. Its purported link to Wewak Agriculture Development Corporation Ltd was first aired in the Greenpeace report, where the two companies were said to share a common address in Port Moresby (Winn 2012: 33) . A more complex set of corporate connections was described in a subsequent report by Oxfam Australia, which aimed to hold Westpac Bank accountable for the Turubu project because of its financial relationship with WTK Realty Ltd (Oxfam 2014: 16) . There is no firm evidence to substantiate these claims. The two companies have offices in Port Moresby that are close to each other but are not identical. The connections described in the Oxfam report are supposedly based on evidence provided to the COI, but the transcripts of the relevant hearings show that this evidence has been misinterpreted. the cabinet decision and the publication of the notices demanding the surrender of 29 leases, so it might perhaps explain why the Turubu lease was one of them. However, the judgement attracted no publicity at the time, and there is another plausible explanation for its inclusion.
One of the new entrants to the national parliament in 2012 was Richard Maru, who was elected to represent Yangoru-Saussia District in East Sepik Province. He had an interest in the Turubu project because the lease included part of his electorate, and he lost no time in voicing his suspicion that the developers were more interested in taking out the logs than putting in the oil palm (Anon. 2012) . This initially led members of the anti-dependency group to hope that Richard Maru would be another champion of their cause, like Governor Gary Juffa, but they were soon disappointed, because it turned out that he was planning to develop another oil palm project in partnership with a different foreign investor. The focal point of this project, which is commonly known as the Sepik Plains project, would be a nucleus estate constructed on a fairly large portion of government land in his own electorate that should not have been included in the Turubu SABL because it had already been alienated by the Australian colonial administration (Anon. 2013) .
11 His own promise to cancel the SABL and give the rest of the land back to the customary landowners was thus connected with his plan for them to become smallholders producing raw material for the mill to be built by his own development partners. In his capacity as Minister for Trade and Industry, Maru was also able to secure a major grant from the Treasury to subsidise the development of his own scheme. So he could well have taken some pains to ensure that the Turubu lease would be cancelled by the Lands Department, regardless of what transpired in the National Court. To the best of my knowledge, only one of these cases had been resolved by the end of 2015, but this was hardly a resolution. In May 2015, Justice Geita began hearing the case brought by the landowner company and the provincial government. Three months later, he ruled that the recommendations of the COI should not have formed the basis for a cabinet decision because the national government had failed to gazette an instrument that would extend the lifetime of the COI beyond March 2012.
12 He also ruled that it was unreasonable of the National Executive Council to include the Turubu lease in the list of 29 that were cancelled in June 2014 without considering the amount of capital already invested in the project. So he reinstated the lease. However, he was careful to say that his own ruling had nothing to do with any future rulings of the Supreme Court in respect of the appeals lodged against the previous ruling of the National Court that cancelled this lease on grounds that were unrelated to the recommendations of the COI. He was also careful to say that his ruling did not necessarily apply to the other 28 leases that the Lands Department had sought to cancel in the wake of the cabinet decision.
Law, Politics and Ideology
Two years after the COI's reports were made available to the public in November 2013, it was still impossible to see an end to the policy process from which it had emerged. It was unclear whether the national government would appeal to the Supreme Court to overturn Justice Geita's ruling, or simply wait to see what the Supreme Court did with the appeals that had already been lodged. The power of the National Executive Council to act on the findings of the COI was as uncertain as the real interest and intent of the ministers responsible for implementing its decisions. By the end of 2015, little more had been heard from the three members of the Ministerial Committee, except for an announcement by the Lands Minister, Benny Allan, that it would not be possible to cancel existing SABLs without enacting some new legislation that his departmental staff would draft 'as soon as possible' (Anon. 2015a).
The 'Special SABL Taskforce' seems to have been established at the end of 2014, but then became an 'SABL Implementation Taskforce' reporting directly to the head of the Prime Minister's Department (Anon. 2015b) . The recommendations of this body were due to be submitted to the National Executive Council in October 2015, but they had not been made public by the end of that year. To judge by notices published in the National Gazette, officials in the Lands Department have not made any further attempt to grant additional SABLs under the current provisions of the Land Act, but there is no evidence that they have drafted amendments to the current legislation that would either get rid of those provisions or change the administration of the land group incorporation process.
For some members of the land grab policy network, the government's failure to take decisive action on this issue is not just a sign of legal complexity or bureaucratic incompetence but proof of systemic corruption at all levels of the political establishment. For members of the anti-dependency group, Gary Juffa, the Governor of Oro Province, is the only member of parliament who has shown that he really cares about the rights and interests of customary landowners, and the only public servants who have shown a comparable concern with the 'rule of law' are members of the judiciary, including John Numapo and Nicholas Mirou. If other politicians and public servants have been unable to avoid the pretence of sharing this concern, then that is only because a new popular front has been mobilised to remind them of their constitutional duties.
Of course, politicians are never immune to public opinion, especially in a country like PNG, where roughly half of the members of parliament have lost their seats at each successive national election. And there is no doubt that members of the anti-dependency group have done a fine job of maintaining a semblance of public outrage through every available medium of communication. In this respect, special credit must go to Effrey Dademo, the founder of an NGO called Act Now (sometimes with an exclamation mark), and Rosa Koian, the campaign manager for another NGO, the Bismarck Ramu Group, which was born out of the ruins of a conservation program funded by the Global Environment Facility in the 1990s (van Helden 2009).
13 Effrey, in particular, has performed a valuable service for all members of the land grab policy network by not 13 Effrey and Rosa were two of the 18 members of the conservation policy community who received the email message in which Paul Barker called for a strategy to make landowners aware of the land grab issue back in January 2010 (see Chapter 6, this volume).
only making regular posts to a dedicated section of the Act Now blog, but also harvesting and recycling information from every corner of the internet that serves to keep the scandal alive.
Effrey and Rosa were the primary authors of an 'open letter to the Prime Minister' that was published as an advertorial in one of the national newspapers in December 2013, shortly after the public release of the COI's final reports, but they wrote this on behalf of a group of 20 NGOs that formed the core of the anti-dependency group at that time (Act Now PNG and Bismarck Ramu Group 2013) . The letter simply demanded that all the 'unlawful' leases must be revoked, the land covered by the leases must be returned to its customary owners, and all the 'illegal' forest clearing authorities must be cancelled. It also called for the COI's reports to be referred to yet another taskforce known as Task Force Sweep, an agency based in the Justice Department that had been established around the same time that the COI started its hearings, and had a mandate to investigate and prosecute cases of corrupt behaviour on the part of politicians and public servants. By the end of 2014, this body had lost the support of the Prime Minister because it had started to investigate his own behaviour, and it never did get around to investigating the abuse of the lease-leaseback scheme, but the call made by the antidependency group still had the effect of aligning the campaign against the land grab with a broader campaign supported by people whose concern with political corruption was not simply a function of their opposition to all forms of large-scale resource development. That is how organisations like Transparency International and Global Witness became part of the reconstructed land grab policy network, almost as if they were occupants of the space vacated by the climate policy group (see Chapter 6, this volume).
Some of the demands made by members of the network since the release of the COI's findings have been somewhat misguided. For example, it is hard to justify the claim that there is anything technically 'illegal' about the grant of forest clearing authorities, and equally hard to see how these could simply be cancelled by the NFB without creating a legal liability to compensate the holders of such permits. As we have seen, the Board has sometimes suspended the permits of companies that failed to comply with their permit conditions, and it does not seem to have granted any new permits until the National Court ruled that the moratorium imposed by the National Executive Council was itself illegal.
14 In October 2014, Act Now teamed up with Transparency International and another local NGO to complain about the Board's decision to renew the forest clearing authority that had been granted to the Sigite-Mukus project four years previously, but were told by forestry officials that nothing could be done so long as the leasehold arrangements were still in effect and the permitholder had complied with the conditions of its permit (Act Now 2014e). The forest clearing authority that had been granted to Albright Ltd in 2009 does seem to have lapsed when the National Court subsequently nullified the SABL that had been issued to the landowner company, Mekeo Hinterland Holdings Ltd. But if the government had been successful in its defence against Albright's claim for damages as a result of this ruling, that does not mean that it could have defended the breach of a contract in which it did have an 'actionable statutory duty' towards the other party, so if the lease had not been nullified, and the sublease was therefore still valid, then cancellation of the clearance permit would have been a risky move.
A second example of false hope is contained in the demand for Task Force Sweep or other organs of the state to prosecute those individuals whose corrupt and illegal behaviour was documented by the COI. The COI's terms of reference did not really allow for an investigation of the chains of influence or command by which politicians got public servants to evade or ignore the procedures that should have established the consent of customary landowners to the alienation of their land. The commissioners found little evidence of bribery, and they made no specific recommendations for the prosecution of the various lands officers and other public servants whose negligence or incompetence was the focus of their investigation. Furthermore, as they often pointed out in the conduct of their hearings, evidence presented to a commission of inquiry cannot later be used as the basis for a criminal conviction, so prosecutions would have to be based on fresh detective work by the police. And finally, the sort of evidence that might be used to convict someone of 'stealing 14 Musa Century Ltd v Peter O'Neill and Others [2013] . PNG National Court judgement N5334, 23 August. An 'unidentified source' has been cited as the basis for a claim that the Board granted a new forest clearing authority over 105,000 hectares of land held under an SABL in West Sepik Province in April 2014 (Global Witness 2014: 3) . This would appear to be the Wammy project, from which a substantial quantity of logs was exported in 2015 (see Table 7 .2, Chapter 7, this volume). customary land' is actually much harder to assemble than the sort of evidence that Task Force Sweep or the Public Prosecutor has used to convict people of stealing public money.
If it is also unreasonable to expect the government to rapidly concoct some new piece of legislation that would instantly nullify an entire collection of leases and licences without risking a new round of litigation on the part of their current owners, it is certainly not unreasonable to ask the question posed by Gary Juffa, which is why government ministers, provincial governors, or other members of parliament have not been helping specific groups of landowners to take legal action in defence of their own property rights. There are now several cases in which the National Court has nullified an SABL on the grounds that some landowners did not consent to it, and none of these judgements has so far been overruled on appeal to the Supreme Court. If the COI and the media campaign have served to enlarge the population of landowners who have just cause for complaint about the loss of their property, why would their elected political leaders not seek to enhance their chances of re-election by helping to retrieve it?
Many members of the anti-dependency group, or the anti-corruption group, think the answer lies in the subordination of these political leaders to foreign business interests. From this assumption it follows that their complacency about the land grab is an affront to nationalist sentiment, as well as to the 'ideology of landownership' that counts every indigenous citizen as a customary landowner who should be rightly jealous of his or her property. But this argument barely makes sense of a political system in which most members of parliament represent electorates in which most of the voters are customary landowners living on their own land, unless it is also assumed that the foreign companies supply the money with which the politicians buy the votes of the people whose land they have conspired to steal.
An alternative explanation can be found in the testimonies that the COI itself collected from the landowners who had an interest in each of the areas covered by its hearings. The majority of the witnesses who objected to the grant of an SABL said that they were not motivated by opposition to whatever form of large-scale resource development had supposedly justified the creation of this new property right, but rather by their exclusion from the decision-making process by which a landowner company had been formed or a foreign investor had been found. In many cases, different landowner companies, or different factions represented on the board of one landowner company, had formed partnerships with different investors, each one with a view to convincing their partners that they alone were the genuine representatives of all the customary owners of the land to be developed. Members of the anti-dependency group have construed this form competition as evidence that foreign investors 'use local intermediaries who often mislead people and use payments in cash or presents to secure consent', while some of these intermediaries 'made deals with foreign companies on land that was not theirs and was actually used by other communities' (Mousseau 2013: 25) . However, those investors who appeared before the COI often appeared to be truly confused by the politics of landowner representation, and there is other evidence to indicate that many potential investors have given up and gone home when they could not see a way to manage this sort of political risk.
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Regardless of the power dynamics of this form of partnership and competition, what matters here is that politicians who aspire to be elected or re-elected as members of the national parliament or as presidents of locallevel governments may rationally calculate that there are more votes to be gained from promising some form of large-scale resource development than from opposing any form of large-scale resource development on the customary land of their constituents. This certainly seems to be the case in some of the provinces where large areas of customary land have been alienated through the lease-leaseback scheme. When the COI had just started to conduct its hearings, Leo Dion declared that there was no need for any inquiry to be conducted in East New Britain Province, of which he was then the Governor, 16 because agro-forestry projects initiated under the lease-leaseback scheme had broad popular support and exemplified the 'public-private partnerships' that were an integral component of the provincial government's development strategy (Anon. 2011) . All of the elected political leaders of that province have consistently toed the same line, so it is not surprising that they have failed to back any legal action taken by groups of dissident landowners who want to get their land back. Indeed, the Prime Minister may have cause to be relieved that East New Britain was one of the three provinces covered in the hearings conducted by Alois Jerewai, so its agro-forestry projects have been saved from any immediate threat to the integrity of their land titles.
Most members of PNG's national parliament would claim to be customary owners of land in their own electorates. Most of the voters in most electorates reside on what they think is still their customary land, even if the law says that it has been alienated. Only a minority of these electorates contain large areas of customary land that have been legally alienated through the lease-leaseback scheme. But most of the members who represent these electorates believe that their own political fortunes are tied to the promise that these areas will be 'developed', and most of the members who represent other electorates, where this form of alienation has not taken place, appear to share the same belief. But all members would still profess to share Gary Juffa's concern for the rights and interests of customary landowners, since these are the people who constitute the nation.
A grand narrative of bribery and corruption does not really serve to explain this combination of phenomena. If it is unrealistic to portray the land grab policy network as a single community of interest with a common policy objective, it may also be unrealistic to portray the state as an overbearing, monolithic, corrupt and incompetent vehicle for the implementation of a neoliberal policy agenda (Lattas 2011) . We need to bear in mind that national government ministers who previously pronounced their public support for the alienation of so many large areas of customary land commonly justified this process by reference to a 'developmental' agenda conceived as a nationalist alternative to the 'neoliberal' policy prescriptions of the World Bank. And in the aftermath of the COI, members of the anti-dependency group have quite correctly asked why a government that is still committed to the same agenda could possibly be expected to halt or reverse the process of expropriation by which it has been implemented. Politicians still talk up the prospects of 'economic corridors', 'special economic zones', 'impact projects' and 'public-private partnerships' in their electorates, but the neoliberal connotations of such terms are given another meaning in the networks of patronage through which they harvest the votes of customary landowners who expect their own leaders to deliver developers to their land. So what seems to be at work here is a contradiction between the ideology of landownership and an ideology of rural or national development that cannot be resolved at any level of political organisation, yet still constitutes a quite distinctive form of political behaviour.
Conclusion
As noted in Chapter 6, the original reason for allowing customary landowners to lease their land to the state and have it leased back to a corporate body of their own choice was the absence of a legal mechanism for the direct registration of customary land titles. That hole in the policy framework has since been plugged with amendments to the Land Registration Act and the Land Groups Incorporation Act. What seems to have bothered John Numapo (and a number of other people) is that these laws may prove to be unworkable, or may only serve to 'mobilise' relatively small areas of customary land. When John said that SABLs should still be the mechanism of choice for what he called 'high-impact' projects needing large amounts of rural land, he had not forgotten the ambitious land mobilisation targets set by the Somare government in a number of policy and planning documents between 2002 and 2011. Richard Maru's solution to this problem, which is to use a large block of public land to form the core of a new rural development project, resembles the policy adopted by the Australian colonial administration when it established the first big oil palm scheme in the 1960s. However, this solution has only limited scope for replication today, not only because of the concentration of such blocks in a narrow coastal belt where they were previously alienated for the development of copra plantations during the colonial period, but also because these blocks are subject to multiple claims of customary ownership that have only grown stronger with the passage of time (Filer 2014 ).
In the first two years after the new legislation was certified and gazetted, about 15,000 hectares of land had apparently been registered in the names of incorporated land groups, but one of the 11 titles whose registration was advertised in the National Gazette accounted for more than two thirds of this land area. More disturbing was a notice published in August 2014, which said that the Lands Department was intending to accept a land investigation report that would establish the ownership of the whole of one local-level government area (more than 470,000 hectares of land) by three incorporated land groups. This example suggests that the problem of consent is not simply solved by insisting that properly constituted land groups be the only legal entities allowed to sublease customary land to private investors, especially if the Lands Department is the arbiter of what constitutes a proper constitution. In this respect, it should be noted that 10 SABLs over areas larger than 10,000 hectares were granted to incorporated land groups before the Commission was established, none of these covered an area larger than 50,000 hectares, all of them look quite suspicious, but only two came to the attention of the Commission.
The size of a block of land is not the only consideration here. One of the SABLs that was investigated by the Commission, and was included in the list of 29 leases that the Lands Department tried to recall in July 2014, covered an area of roughly 25 hectares in the national capital, Port Moresby. Within a month of the publication of the notice of revocation, representatives of one local clan were complaining that officers of the Lands Department had certified the reincorporation of the clan that was implicated in the SABL without providing the legally required opportunity for objections to be made to its original claim to customary ownership of the land in question (Anon. 2014) .
17 This is one of several cases in the national capital which suggest that the capacity of some people to appropriate customary land claimed by other people is not so much a function of the land area in question as of the value of the economic benefits to be obtained from its development.
The recommendations of the Commission left open the possibility that land groups already involved in the grant of an SABL could reincorporate themselves under the terms of the amended legislation, register titles to their land, and then grant fresh subleases to investors of their choice. However, the operators of PNG's existing oil palm schemes, who hold a number of subleases under SABLs previously granted to incorporated land groups, have already discovered that this is likely to be a painfully slow process unless the participants, including officers of the Lands Department, are willing and able to bend or break the law. That is why John Numapo, as a member of the land development group in the land grab policy network, doubts the capacity of the new legislation to solve the problem of development, and that is why members of the antidependency group consider the new legislation as a mask for the real problem of corruption (Act Now 2014f ). The events that have followed the public release of the Commission's findings suggest an additional conclusion: that appeals to the 'rule of law', whether in the form of legislation, litigation or adjudication, will not suffice to settle the contest between the ideologies of landownership and development that is still being played out at every level of political organisation, from the level of the nation-state to the level of the rural or urban council ward.
